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Abstract—The business potential of device-to-device (D2D)
communication including public safety and vehicular communi-
cations will be realized only if direct communication between de-
vices subscribed to different mobile operators (OPs) is supported.
One possible way to implement inter-operator D2D communica-
tion may use the licensed spectrum of the OPs, i.e., OPs agree to
share spectrum in a co-primary manner, and inter-operator D2D
communication is allocated over spectral resources contributed
from both parties. In this paper, we consider a spectrum sharing
scenario where a number of OPs construct a spectrum pool
dedicated to support inter-operator D2D communication. OPs
negotiate in the form of a non-cooperative game about how
much spectrum each OP contributes to the spectrum pool. OPs
submit proposals to each other in parallel until a consensus is
reached. When every OP has a concave utility function on the
box-constrained region, we identify the conditions guaranteeing
the existence of a unique equilibrium point. We show that the
iterative algorithm based on the OP’s best response might not
converge to the equilibrium point due to myopically overreacting
to the response of the other OPs, while the Jacobi-play strategy
update algorithm can converge with an appropriate selection of
update parameter. Using the Jacobi-play update algorithm, we
illustrate that asymmetric OPs contribute an unequal amount of
resources to the spectrum pool; However all participating OPs
may experience significant performance gains compared to the
scheme without spectrum sharing.
Index Terms—Co-primary spectrum sharing, Inter-operator
D2D, Spectrum pooling, Non-cooperative game.
I. INTRODUCTION
The 5th Generation (5G) wireless networks are expected
to be much more densely deployed than today’s networks
due to the rapid increase in the number of connected devices
and traffic volumes [1]. It is expected to require a 1000
times higher traffic capacity and a 10 to 100 times higher
typical user rate [2]. Possible ways to satisfy these increasing
demands are to allocate more spectrum and improve spectral
efficiency. Since spectrum is rather scarce, especially below
6 GHz [3], mobile network operators, which we will refer
to as operators (OPs) hereafter, will need schemes that utilize
spectrum more efficiently. One way to do so is to enable inter-
operator spectrum sharing in a co-primary manner [4], called
co-primary spectrum sharing (CoPSS), where multiple OPs
jointly use a part of their licensed spectrum to enable an OP
to cope with temporary peaks in capacity demand.
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Conventionally, operator spectrum allocation has been done
in an exclusive manner. Exclusive licensing has well-known
advantages including good interference management and guar-
antee of Quality-of-Service (QoS) for market players, neces-
sary for creating an adequate investment and innovation envi-
ronment. However, it also suffers from low flexibility and as a
result low spectrum utilization might occur. To overcome these
limitations, a combination of exclusive spectrum allocation and
shared spectrum access has been proposed for 5G systems [2].
Device-to-device (D2D) communication allows two devices
to establish direct communication bypassing the base station
(BS). CoPSS can be used for inter-operator D2D communi-
cation, when two users having subscriptions with different
OPs want to communicate directly, and the communication
should take place over the licensed spectrum of the OPs. The
only available studies for inter-operator D2D can be found in
[5]–[8]. The patents [5], [6] design D2D discovery protocols
considering different OPs. An algorithm for inter-operator
D2D spectrum allocation is proposed in [7], and an inter-
operator D2D trial is presented in [8], however, the works
in [5], [6], [8] do not discuss how to negotiate the amount of
spectrum every OP is willing to contribute, and the work in
[7] is limited to spectrum negotiations between two OPs only.
The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) is in the
process of standardizing D2D communication for 5G networks
[9]–[13]. Valuable D2D services provided by the 3GPP system
have been identified in [9]–[11], i.e., commercial services and
public safety. In [12], operational requirements for D2D com-
munication are reported, particularly for spectrum operations.
The radio resource for two D2D users registered to a Public
Land Mobile Network (PLMN) would be under 3GPP network
control. The communication of two D2D users registered to
different PLMNs is subject to the available spectrum, i.e., the
shared Radio Access Network (RAN) [12].
The sharing of RAN where multiple OPs share network
resources has been established in 3GPP [13]. The OPs do
not only share the radio network infrastructures but may
also share the spectrum, i.e., active RAN sharing. In [13],
feasible scenarios of inter-operator radio resource sharing are
illustrated, i.e., flexibly and dynamically allocating resources
on-demand. Since OPs may have different demands, one
requirement is to allocate a different amount of resource to
different OPs, i.e., allocating a certain amount of resource for
a specified period of time and/or cells on-demand, or guar-
anteeing/limiting a minimum/maximum spectrum allocation.
However, [13] does not propose any algorithm to determine
the amount of spectrum allocated to each OP and address
the requirement on inter-operator spectrum sharing for D2D
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In parallel with the standardization effort, research is being
undertaken to address the fundamental problems in supporting
co-primary inter-operator spectrum sharing. In many studies,
inter-operator spectrum sharing has been treated as a game
where OPs participating in the game are players, each has
an individual utility to maximize, can either cooperate or
compete to deal with the strategic interactions of one another
for a game-theoretic problem. A cooperative game approach
is proposed in [14]–[16] where participating OPs can obtain
the benefits, i.e., fair and efficient spectrum allocation, from
exchanging operator-specific information, i.e., channel state
[14], utility function [15], interference price [16]. However,
OPs are essentially competitors, and may not want to reveal
proprietary information to the competitors and other parties.
Considering the selfishness of OPs, spectrum sharing based on
a non-cooperative game approach is more appropriate to model
and analyze strategic interactions in a co-primary manner.
A non-cooperative game approach has been studied for
spectrum sharing between co-primary users [17]–[21]. In [17],
spectrum sharing among co-located RANs based on a one-
shot game has been studied, but the equilibrium point under
load asymmetry could be inefficient for some OPs who do
not impose any operator-specific constraints on the decision
space. In [18], a distributed learning algorithm for spectrum
sharing has been proposed to increase the convergence rate.
The learning rate chosen by each user would result in different
convergence rates among the users, thus stability is not en-
sured. In [19], [20], auction-based spectrum sharing is studied,
where participating OPs competitively bid for spectrum access
through a spectrum broker. In [21], penalty-based utility func-
tions for spectrum sharing are constructed. Adopting market-
driven or punishment-based sharing schemes, however, might
not be realistic, because OPs may not be willing to change
their revenue models. Above all, the algorithms [17]–[21] do
not consider the heterogeneity in service type offered by OPs,
i.e., mainly cellular link is considered.
There have been many studies on spectrum sharing for
D2D communication, e.g., [22] among others, but only single-
operator D2D is taken into account. Spectrum allocation for
inter-operator D2D based on a non-cooperative game model
was first proposed in [7]. Provided that the game is concave
and every OP satisfies the diagonal dominance solvability
condition (DSC), there exists a unique NE (Nash Equilibrium)
and the sequence of best responses converges to it from any
initial point. However, the analysis and convergence of the
best responses are valid only in a setting with two OPs. In
this paper, we extend the study presented in [7] by consid-
ering CoPSS for inter-operator D2D communication with an
arbitrary number of OPs. The main novelty and contributions
of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• Inter-operator D2D communication over dedicated cel-
lular spectral resources contributed from an arbitrary
number of OPs, is proposed, while intra-operator D2D
users subscribed to the same OP can use a dedicated
resource or reuse the cellular resources of the OP.
• A general framework for a constraint-based utility max-
imization problem is proposed, where different prefer-
ences of different operators are encompassed. This can
be extensively applied to utility and constraint designs
under concavity and monotonicity.
• A non-cooperative game for co-primary interaction is
established, where the OPs make offers about the amount
of spectrum committed to the spectrum pool without
revealing operator-specific information to other OPs, and
the offers are exchanged by an iterative strategy update
algorithm. We show that the Jacobi-play update, with a
careful selection of update parameter, can converge to
a unique equilibrium with an arbitrary number of OPs,
enabling an OP to set the reliable but myopic strategy in
a distributed manner.
• Using the proposed CoPSS solution, we show that all OPs
under different intra-operator loads can experience per-
formance gains compared to the baseline scheme where
the OPs do not share spectrum. The efficiency of the non-
cooperative game solution is evaluated for different utility
designs, weighted sum and weighted proportional fair.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section
II, the system model and problem formulation are presented.
In Section III, the non-cooperative game is established with
the utility and constraint designs, the existence of a NE, the
introduction of the iterative algorithm to reach a NE, and the
relation between the uniqueness and local stability properties
of a NE. In section IV, the necessary and sufficient conditions
for the convergence of the iterative algorithm are provided, and
a distributed algorithm always converging to a unique NE is
proposed. In Section V, we demonstrate the spectrum sharing
gain. Section VII concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we consider the system model and problem
formulation used in [26], applicable to increasing the co-
primary spectrum usage opportunities for 5G mobile operators.
A. System model
We consider N OPs enabling D2D communication. An OP
may have two types of D2D users: firstly, intra-operator D2D
(a.k.a. intra-D2D) users, i.e., the two ends in the D2D pair have
subscriptions with the same OP; secondly, and inter-operator
D2D (a.k.a. inter-D2D) users. A D2D pair can communicate
in a D2D manner (a.k.a. D2D mode) or via the nearby
serving BSs (a.k.a. cellular mode). D2D communication in
unlicensed bands would suffer from unpredictable interference.
Because of that, at this moment, licensed spectrum seems to
be the way forward to enable D2D communication, especially
considering safety-related scenarios such as vehicle-to-vehicle
communication. In the licensed band, either dedicated spec-
trum can be allocated to the D2D users (a.k.a. D2D overlay)
or D2D and cellular users can be allocated over the same
resources (a.k.a. D2D underlay). An intra-D2D underlay has
a higher spectrum reuse factor and it may result in high
spectral efficiency with appropriate interference management.
An intra-D2D overlay enjoys higher spectral efficiency than
the case where D2D communication is not enabled, and less
3Fig. 1. Spectrum divisions for inter-operator D2D communication.
implementation complexity than the underlay case [22]. In
an inter-D2D underlay, cellular users may suffer from inter-
operator interference, and in order to resolve it, information
exchange between the OPs might be needed. Due to the fact
that OPs may not be willing to reveal proprietary information,
we believe that, at the first stage, the inter-D2D overlay scheme
would be easier to implement [7].
Each OP utilizes the total available spectrum divided into
multiple sub-bands. Without loss of generality, we assume a
fixed and equal bandwidth for sub-bands to easily determine
the total available sub-bands. The number of available sub-
bands are equally allocated among all users for fairness of
resource usage, or may be based on a set QoS per user. We
assume a fair share of resources among users. In particular, in
CoPSS, whether or not an OP may contribute an equal amount
of spectrum to the shared band, the performance accessible to
inter-D2D users in D2D mode should be proportional to the
bandwidth allocated to the spectrum pool under the fairness
rule [26]. In inter-D2D and intra-D2D modes, each user
accesses a sub-band with a certain medium access probability.
In cellular mode, the resource allocation is controlled by the
BS which schedules the users in a round-robin manner, and
thus the corresponding spectrum resource is shared equally.
Accordingly, the average numbers of users over sub-bands
allocated for each transmission mode are the same.
Fig. 1 shows the spectrum allocation for the OPs in case they
employ the overlay principle for inter-D2D communication,
while intra-D2D communication can be either in overlay or
underlay. A fraction βcdi of the i-th OP’s spectrum is dedicated
for cellular and intra-D2D communications. The fraction βcdi is
further divided into two sub-fractions in an intra-D2D overlay
scheme, βcdi = β
c
i + β
d
i where β
c
i and β
d
i are fractions of
the i-th OP’s spectrum, dedicated for cellular and intra-D2D
communications, respectively. No matter which scheme is used
for intra-D2D communication, an OP contributes a fraction βi
of spectrum to the spectrum pool, β =
∑
i βi, where inter-
D2D communication takes place. An inter-D2D pair can use
any of the resources contributed to the pool. Obviously, βcdi +
βi = 1,∀i. While in our analysis we assume FDD OPs that
contribute frequency resources for D2D communication, the
same analysis is applicable to TDD OPs that contribute time-
frequency resource blocks with time synchronization among
the OPs.
The mode selection decides whether a D2D pair should
be communicating in D2D or in cellular mode. The mode
selection algorithm is not necessarily the same for different
OPs neither for inter-D2D and intra-D2D communications.
Mode selection determines the density of D2D transmissions,
thus the potentials for increasing the frequency reuse factor.
At the same time, it affects the amount of interference among
the intra-D2D users and the cellular users in a D2D underlay,
and the amount of the D2D self-interference in a D2D overlay.
As a result, mode selection and spectrum allocation for D2D
communication are coupled in the system design. For instance,
in dense deployments, a mode selection resulting in high inter-
D2D density and thus in high self-interference in D2D can
be compensated by allocating more spectrum for inter-D2D
communication. This means there would be less spectrum
available for cellular and intra-D2D transmissions in an inter-
D2D overlay.
In literature, mode selection for single-operator D2D utilizes
either D2D pair distance [23] and/or the distance between
the D2D transmitter and cellular BS [27], or energy-based
detection threshold [28] as selection criterion. In a setting
with multiple OPs, implementation of mode selection is not
straightforward: Participating OPs need to agree about the
mode selection criteria in the spectrum pool. Also, they need to
decide which OP should be responsible for taking the decision
and communicating it to the users. In this paper, we investigate
the spectrum allocation problem, while the mode selection is
not treated in detail. Instead, we model the impact of mode
selection through the fraction of intra-D2D users selecting
D2D mode, denoted by δi, and the fraction of inter-D2D users
selecting D2D mode, denoted by q. The parameters, δi and q,
are related. For instance, when the value of q increases, more
inter-D2D users would select D2D mode, or equivalently less
inter-D2D users would communicate over cellular resources.
This would affect the parameter settings, e.g., δi and βi, which
determine the performance accessible to cellular and intra-
D2D users. This model can be extended to incorporate the
impact of more general mode selection algorithms on the
performance gain for a future study.
B. Problem formulation
Each OP must experience performance gain from enabling
inter-D2D communication. Such a gain can be quantified by
excess utility showing the difference between the OP’s utility,
Ui, when spectrum sharing is used, i.e.,βi> 0, and the utility,
Umini , when spectrum sharing is not used, i.e., βi = 0. When
the utility of an OP with spectrum sharing is lower than the
utility with no sharing, Ui < Umini , the spectrum would not
be shared. Inter-operator D2D support poses a requirement for
exchanging signaling information between the OPs. Because
of that, when spectrum sharing takes place, we assume that an
OP contributes at least a small positive fraction of spectrum,
βmini >0, i.e, βi≥βmini , for the signaling channel. OPs agree
a priori to use a common decision threshold for selecting the
inter-D2D mode. This threshold can be mapped to a fraction of
inter-D2D users communicating over D2D, q. OPs are free to
optimize the fraction of intra-D2D users communicating over
D2D, δi. Hence, the value of δi is not necessarily equal to the
corresponding fraction without spectrum sharing.
The utility of an OP, Ui, may depend on the amount of
spectrum all OPs contribute to the spectrum pool, β, while
4the utility, Umini , does not. Given the aggregate proposal
from the opponents, β−i =
∑
j 6=i βj , each OP identifies its
contribution, βi, and intra-D2D mode selection parameter,
δi, for maximizing the utility, Ui, under operator-specific
constraints. These constraints can, for instance, refer to the
rates of cellular users and intra-D2D users in D2D mode. The
constraint functions for cellular users and intra-D2D users in
D2D mode could be larger than target values, respectively,
hci ≥ τ ci and hdi ≥ τdi . The utility, Umini , and the constraint
functions for no spectrum sharing can be evaluated in advance.
We assume that feasible target values are selected so that these
constraints without spectrum sharing, i.e., β=0 and q = 0, are
satisfied. To sum up, the amount of spectrum to be contributed
for inter-D2D communication, βi, and the fraction of the intra-
D2D users in D2D mode, δi, could be identified as follows
Maximize :
βi,δi
Ui(βi, δi). (1a)
Subject to : hci (βi, δi) ≥ τ ci . (1b)
hdi (βi, δi) ≥ τdi . (1c)
We assume that the utility function, Ui, in (1a) is concave
in βi for a fixed δi. The concavity of the utility with respect to
βi indicates that the marginal utility decreases with a further
increase in βi; Diminishing marginal utility means that the
more an OP contributes spectrum to the spectrum pool, the less
utility gain is obtained. Once the maximum of Ui is achieved,
any further increase in βi may decrease Ui. For instance, if
Ui incorporates both inter-D2D and cellular or intra-D2D user
rates, allocating more spectrum in the spectrum pool could
increase the rate of inter-D2D users in D2D mode, but at
the same time less spectrum becomes available for cellular
and intra-D2D transmissions. We assume that the constraint
functions, hci and h
d
i are concave in βi for fixed δi. These
assumptions allow the one-dimensional constraint set of an OP
to be convex, closed, and bounded. Thus, if there is always
a βi such that the constraints in (1b) and (1c) are strictly
satisfied, the first-order KKT conditions are both necessary
and sufficient.
In an intra-D2D underlay, we assume that constraint func-
tions, hci in (1b) and h
d
i in (1c), are decreasing in βi for a
fixed value of δi, because the cellular and intra-D2D user
rates should be increasing functions of the allocated bandwidth
βcdi . This would make h
c
i and h
d
i decreasing functions. Let
βcdi denote the amount of spectrum fraction for cellular and
intra-D2D communications, satisfying the constraints (1b) and
(1c). Due to the fact that the left-hand-sides (LHSs) of (1b)
and (1c) are increasing in βcdi , the two minimum values of β
cd
i
satisfying the constraints (1b) and (1c) make the LHSs of (1b)
and (1c) equal to τ ci and τ
d
i , respectively. Using β
cd
i =1−βi,
the constraints (1b) and (1c) can be converted to a single
inequality constraint, 1−βi≥βcd,mini =max(βcdi,c, βcdi,d) where
βcdi,c and β
cd
i,d satisfy (1b) and (1c) with equality, respectively.
In an intra-D2D overlay, we assume that each OP has a
utility function considering the D2D user rates so that the
maximum of the utility occurs along the feasibility border of
the spectrum allocation factor βci with respect to δi. Thus,
for a fixed δi, the constraint function for cellular users could
be equal to a target value, hci = τ
c
i , and the optimization
property is the same as in the intra-D2D underlay case. Let
βc,mini denote the amount of spectrum fraction for cellular
communication, satisfying the constraint (1b) with equality.
Due to the fact that the LHS of (1c) is increasing in βdi ,
the minimum βdi satisfying the constraint (1c) makes the
LHS of (1c) equal to τdi . Using β
d
i = 1 − βci − βi, the
constraints (1b) with equality and (1c) can be converted to
an inequality constraint, 1−βi≥βc,mini +βd,mini where βd,mini
satisfies (1c) with equality. As a result, the upper limits of the
constraint set, βmaxi = 1−βcd,mini in an intra-D2D underlay
and βmaxi =1−βc,mini −βd,mini in an intra-D2D overlay do not
depend on the proposals from the opponents, which result in
a box constraint, βmini ≤ βi≤ βmaxi , respectively, for a fixed
δi.
While the problem in (1) is concave in βi, it is not known
to be jointly concave in both βi and δi. In case of the
nonconvex problem in (1), finding an optimal solution may
be intractable, since the first order conditions are necessary,
but not always sufficient. Note that the optimal solution of the
problem in (1) exhibits the intuitive monotonicity property.
The use of the monotonicity property would substantially
alleviate the difficulty in obtaining the optimal solution of
the problem in (1), by allowing some solution to be on the
boundary of the feasible set. For the monotonic solution,
according to Topkis’s theorem [29], the constraint set needs
to have an ascending or descending property. This property is
satisfied if the boundaries of the constraint set are increasing or
decreasing functions of a parameter. We assume that the upper
limits of βi are increasing in δi, determined by β
c,min
i and
βd,mini in an intra-D2D overlay, and β
cd,min
i in an intra-D2D
underlay, respectively. Thus, if βc,mini , β
d,min
i , and β
cd,min
i ,
are decreasing in δi, βmaxi is increasing in δi and thus the
constraint sets hold the ascending property [29].
In an intra-D2D overlay, we assume that βc,mini and β
d,min
i
are decreasing in δi. The LHSs of (1b) and (1c) are increasing
in δi for a fixed value of βi, because more intra-D2D users in
D2D mode yield more time resources available for cellular-
based communication and more concurrent D2D transmis-
sions, resulting in increasing rates of cellular users and intra-
D2D users in D2D mode. Due to the increased interference,
D2D link rate might decrease but the increasing fraction of
intra-D2D users in D2D mode dominates the rate in D2D
mode, which will be justified later. This would make hci and h
d
i
increasing functions of δi. Since hci and h
d
i are also increasing
in βci and β
d
i , respectively, less β
c
i and β
d
i could sustain certain
values of hci and h
d
i with more δi. This would make β
c,min
i
and βd,mini decreasing in δi.
In an intra-D2D underlay, we assume thatβcd,mini is decreas-
ing in δi, where β
cd,min
i is determined by the two minimum
values of βcdi , β
cd
i,c and β
cd
i,d satisfying the constraints in (1b)
and (1c) with equalities, respectively. While hdi in (1c) is
increasing with δi as in an intra-D2D overlay case and thus
βcdi,d is decreasing in δi, h
c
i in (1b) stays almost constant or even
slightly decreases with δi [23], due to the interference caused
by underlaid D2D transmissions. The selected target value for
the D2D mode, τdi , is assumed to be large enough such that
it is usually larger than the one for the cellular mode, τ ci , β
cd
i,d
5is larger than βcdi,c, and the cellular users with β
cd
i,d are able
to achieve the performance strictly larger than τ ci . Thus, β
cd
i,d
determines βcd,mini which is decreasing in δi. Thus, the upper
limits of βi, βmaxi = 1 − βcd,mini in an intra-D2D underlay
and βmaxi = 1−βc,mini −βd,mini in an intra-D2D overlay, are
increasing function of δi, holding the ascending property.
III. NON-COOPERATIVE GAME MODEL
We consider a strategic non-cooperative spectrum sharing
game among N OPs, G = (N ,S,U), where N is the set of
OPs, S=S1×· · ·×SN is the set of the joint strategies, and
U = [U1,· · ·,UN ] is the vector of utilities. The strategy space
for an OP represents the spectrum fraction contributed to the
spectrum pool, i.e., Si={βi :βmini ≤βi≤ βmaxi (δi)}, ∀i.
A. Design of operator specific utility and constraints
Each user calculates it’s utility with the information of
the performance locally measured or obtained via feedback
channel from the receiver, and then sends it to the BS. With the
utility information of all users, each OP can calculate the aver-
age utility and then broadcast it to all users for their intra-D2D
mode selection decision which determines the density of active
D2D users in the intra-D2D mode, δi and spectrum allocation
factor, βi. OPs may have different preferences concerning the
spectrum allocation formulated by means of a utility function.
Considering the different types of users, a utility in (1a)
can be expressed as Ui = ui(Qci ,Q
d
i ,Q
s
i ) where Q
k
i is the
(normalized) average rate of the k-th type users, k∈{c, d, s},
and c, d and s correspond to cellular, intra-D2D and inter-
D2D users. ui(·) can take different forms, e.g., weighted sum
rate function:
∑
kw
k
iQ
k
i , or weighted proportional fair (P.F)
function:
∑
k w
k
i logQ
k
i where w
k
i ≥ 0 are weights indicating
the normalized densities of the k-th type users.
The average rate, Qki , refers to the ability of the k-th type
users to achieve a certain level of data rate performance,
which is generally assessed by scaling their average spectral
efficiency, Rmi , with the normalized bandwidth, β
m
i , available
for every m-th type link mode, and summing it for all trans-
mission modes, ∀m ∈ {c, d, s} where c, d and s correspond
to cellular, intra-D2D and inter-D2D transmission modes, i.e.,
Qci = β
c
i R
c
i for cellular users, Q
d
i = β
c
i R
c
i (1−δi)+βdi Rdi δi
for intra-D2D overlay users, and Qsi = β
c
i R
c
i (1−q)+βRsq
for inter-D2D overlay users where δi and q are fractions of
intra-D2D users and inter-D2D users selecting respective D2D
modes. We assume that the constraint functions for cellular
users and intra-D2D users in D2D mode are hci = β
c
iR
c
i and
hdi = δiβ
d
i R
d
i , respectively. For intra-D2D underlay mode, Q
c
i ,
Qdi , Q
s
i , h
c
i , and h
d
i can be obtained by replacing β
c
i and β
d
i
with βcdi .
The average rate of the m-th type link mode can be obtained
as a function of SINR in semiclosed form by averaging
over the distribution of the coverage probability, expressed as
Rmi =E[ν
m
i log(1 + γ
m
i )]=
∫∞
0
νmi Pmi
(1+γ) dγ where γ is the SINR
target, γmi is the SINR, Pmi is the coverage probability and
νmi is the portion of time a typical user is active in the m-th
type link mode. The index i is omitted in an inter-D2D mode,
i.e., Rsi = R
s ∀i. In a real system, the average rate can be
computed based on the measurements which can be captured
by distributions. In this paper, we analyze the average rates for
different communication modes by using a stochastic geometry
approach [23]. Such a stochastic geometry-based performance
can serve as the basis for game theory analysis [30].
The coverage probability for a typical user in the m-th
type mode in the presence of Rayleigh fading is computed
as in [23] Pmi =
∫∞
0
fm(d)e
−σ2βmi smLIm(sm) dd where
fm(d) is the probability density function of the link distance,
d, LIm(sm) is the Laplace transform (LT) of the aggregate
interference, Im, sm = γPml(d) , Pm is a transmit power level,
l(·) is the distance-based pathloss model, and σ2 is the noise
power level calculated over the full cellular band. There are
different types of interferers based on D2D sharing approach,
i.e., overlay or underlay. For a typical user in the cellular
mode, we have LIc = LIcc in an intra-D2D overlay and
LIc = LIcc +LIcd in an intra-D2D underlay where Icc and
Icd represent the interference from out-of-cell cellular users
and intra-D2D users. For a typical user in the D2D mode, we
have LId =LIdd in an intra-D2D overlay and LId =LIdd+LIdc
in an intra-D2D underlay where Idd and Idc represent the
interference from other intra-D2D users and cellular users.
Similarly, in an inter-D2D overlay, we have LIs =LIss where
Iss represents the interference from other inter-D2D users.
The interference level also depends on the density of in-
terferers computed only after specifying the mode selection
scheme. We assume that the locations of BSs, cellular, intra-
D2D and inter-D2D users follow independent Poisson point
processes (PPPs) with densities, λbi , λ
c
i , λ
d
i and λ, respectively.
And the mode selections in intra-D2D and inter-D2D modes
just thin the PPPs with δi and q. Then, LIcc and LIcd can
be expressed as in [23] LIcc = e−2piαiλ
b
i
∫∞
d (
sc·Pcl(r)
1+sc·Pcl(r) )rdr
and LIcd =e−2piδiλ
d
i
∫∞
0
(
sc·Pdl(r)
1+sc·Pdl(r)
)
rdr. LIdd can be obtained
by replacing sc with sd in LIcd . LIdc can be obtained with
replacing δiλdi with αiλ
b
i , sc with sd and Pd with Pc in LIcd .
LIss can be obtained by replacing δiλdi with qλ, sc with ss,
and Pd with Ps in LIcd . Note that αi is the probability a BS
is active and should take into account not only the densities
of cellular users but also the density of D2D users selecting
cellular communication mode, i.e., (1−δi)λdi +(1−q)λ/N .
Proposition 1. The weighted sum rate utility, Ui = (1−
wsi )Q
d
i +w
s
i Q
s
i , and the weighted P.F rate utility, Ui = (1−
wsi ) log(Q
d
i )+w
s
i log(Q
s
i ), are concave in βi for 0 ≤ wsi ≤ 1.
Proof. The proof is in Appendix A.
Proposition 2. The constraint set has an ascending property.
Proof. The proof is in Appendix B.
Depending on individual intra-D2D mode selection policy,
each OP may use a two-dimensional strategy domain with a
variable internal state, i.e., δmini ≤ δi ≤ δmaxi ,∀i, or a one-
dimensional strategy domain with a fixed internal state, δi →
δoi , where δ
o
i is a fraction of intra-D2D users in D2D mode
used for no spectrum sharing. While the utility is concave in
βi, it is not jointly in βi and δi. Due to the ascending property
of the strategy space, the solutions of the problem (1) will be
6partly on the boundary of the feasible set, δi → δmaxi . No
matter which intra-D2D mode selection policy is used, i.e., the
optimal value of δi, δi → δmaxi , or its fixed value, δi → δoi ,
the selected parameter, δi determines the one-dimensional box
constraint, and the amount of its coupled spectrum fraction
is proposed for the spectrum pool. The solution, βi, of the
optimization problem (1) maximizes the individual utility, but
may not be a NE in a non-cooperative spectrum sharing game,
G. Next, we study the properties and solutions of the game.
B. Existence of NE and Iterative Dynamics
In G, the NE is an important concept since it represents a
steady state where the utilities of all OPs are maximized. A
strategy profile vector β′ = [β′1, · · · , β′N ] ∈ RN is a NE if for
every OP i ∈ N , Ui(β′i,β′−i) ≥ Ui(βi,β′−i),∀βi ∈ Si where
β′−i = [β
′
1,· · ·,β′i−1,β′i+1,· · ·,β′N ]. One of the most important
questions is whether a NE exists or not.
Proposition 3. ( [32]) The game G admits at least one NE,
since Si is a non-empty, compact1, and convex set of Euclidean
space, and each utility is continuous and concave on Si.
Once proven that a NE always exists, the problem of
how to reach such an equilibrium arises. In order to reach
the NE, an iterative distributed strategy update algorithm
can be used. If strategies at t − 1-th iteration are β(t−1),
the iterative strategy scheme leads to the strategies for t-th
iteration, described as β(t) = M(β(t−1)) where M(·) is an
iterative response process which is a vector valued mapping
function, M = [M1,· · · ,MN ]T ⊆ RN . The most common
updating orders for β based on the mapping M are the parallel
update and the sequential update. We prove the convergence
for parallel update mapping where all components are updated
simultaneously, i.e., β(t)i = Mi(β
(t−1)),∀i. Due to the lack of
space we omit the sequential update case.
In this paper, we consider an iterative algorithm, the Jacobi-
play (JP) strategy update. The mapping function implemented
by the JP dynamic is given as
Mi(β
(t−1)) = (1− κ(t)i )β(t−1)i + κ(t)i BRi(β(t−1)−i ),∀i (2)
where BRi(β−i) = arg maxβi∈Si Ui(βi,β−i) is the best re-
sponse to the aggregate proposal from the opponents, β(t−1)−i =
[β
(t−1)
1 ,· · ·,β(t−1)i−1 ,β(t−1)i+1 ,· · ·,β(t−1)N ], and κ(t)i > 0 is called a
smoothing parameter2 representing the willingness of i-th OP
at t-th iteration to maximize its own utility. The Best-reply
(BR) strategy is a special case of the JP strategy choosing
κ
(t)
i = 1. The difference between the two algorithms is in
whether or not to have κ(t)i = 1,∀t, which enables the OPs
to behave in a myopic manner, strictly or flexibly.
A mapping function satisfying some convergent condition
would converge to a NE. This is guaranteed if M(·) is con-
traction mapping [35], ρ
(
T (t)
)
<1 where ρ (·) is the spectral
radius andT (t)=
[
∂Mi(·)
∂βj
]
∀i,j
are derivatives of M(·). However,
1Strategy space is compact if it is closed and bounded.
2It is known as speed of adjustment in [33, p.278]. JP generally achieves a
smoother move than BR does in case of non-supermodular games which have
a unique NE. The small smoothing parameter plays the role of compensating
for the instability of the BR dynamic, see [34, Sec 4.1.3].
when the value ofρ(T (t)) is used as the convergence criterion,
a central entity is needed for collecting the coefficients of T (t)
from all OPs. This undesirable case in G can be replaced by
a sufficient condition.
Lemma 1. ( [36]) If each OP satisfies that the sum of the
row line of the matrix T (t) is less than one, ‖T (t)‖∞ < 1, the
iterative update β(t) = M(β(t−1)) is a contracting iteration.
If every OP satisfies the condition everywhere individually,
and thus the NE obtained as a result of such an iterative play is
globally stable, then the iterative response process converges
to the unique NE, and thus no matter where the game starts
the final outcome will be the same, the global stability of
the equilibrium candidate points implies uniqueness. However,
this is restrictive, because the contraction mapping may be
only satisfied with partial strategy space implying local sta-
bility. Thus, the obtained NE might not be unique. In case
there are multiple NEs, the selected equilibrium would depend
on the initial strategy profile [35]. This might be undesirable
because the performance of an OP would depend on the initial
proposals of other OPs.
C. Uniqueness of NE
The non-trivial condition for the uniqueness of a NE in G
can be relaxed by showing that a locally stable NE is unique
[35]. We check whether a locally stable NE obtained as a
result of such an iterative play is unique by the Poincaré-
Hopf (PH) Index [37], [38] requiring a certain sign from the
Hessian, H , but this requirement needs to hold only at a NE,
β′. The obtained sign can be used to define the index for a
NE, Ind(β′)=sign(det(−H(β′))). We present some results
on the structure of the NE set, providing conditions for the
NEs to be locally unique, finite and globally unique.
Let K be the set of NE points. We first claim that K, is finite.
Consider a NE β′ ∈ K where K is bounded due to the upper
limit of the constraint set and closed due to the continuity of
response mapping function, thus compact. The NE is locally
unique if it is a strict local maximum of the utility function. If
every NE is locally unique, it is locally isolated. Thus, there
exists an open neighborhood such that there are no other NEs
in the open set. The union of these open sets forms a cover
for the set K ⊂ S. Since K is compact, it can be covered by a
finite number of sets each containing a NE. Hence, the number
of the locally stable NEs, |K|, is finite. Also, due to the fact
that the strategy space is non-empty and convex, the sum of
the indices for NEs is equal to one,
∑
β′∈K Ind(β
′) = 1 [37].
A locally stable NE, β′, is formed by the local maximum of
each utility function. A strict local maximum can be ensured
by a second order condition [39] which requires that i) the
NE satisfies the complementary condition, ∇Ui(β′) = 0,∀i
and ii) the Hessian at complementary NE is negative definite,
det(−H(β′)) > 0 where β′ ∈ K. From the second order
conditions, the PH index theorem restricts the critical point to
be in the interior, βmini <βi<β
max
i (δi),∀i.
In G, it is difficult to rule out the boundary NE where
at least one of the OPs selects the strategy profile on the
boundary of the strategy space. The restriction can be resolved
7by a generalized version of the PH index [37] which requires
complementary and non-degeneracy assumptions. A NE is
called non-degenerate if ∇U is continuously differentiable at
β′ and H(β′)|N´ is non-singular where N´ = {i ∈ N|βmini <
β′i < β
max
i (δi)} denotes the set of OPs selecting interior
profile, and H|N´ denotes the principal sub-matrix of H
corresponding to the indices in N´ . Thus, the non-degeneracy
assumption boils down to the complementary condition for the
sub-matrices of H .
In G, it is still non-trivial to evaluate the sign of the sub-
matrix of the Hessian at a non-degenerate point. When an
OP chooses the lower limit, β′i = β
min
i , or upper limit,
β′i = β
max
i (δi), of his own strategy, other OPs are not able to
notice the boundary profile. Thus, it is difficult to obtain the
sub-matrix structure, H(β′)|N´ , and check the non-singularity
of the sub-matrix. In [38], a stronger non-degeneracy condition
is introduced to replace the complementarity condition with
P -matrix property where the determinants of the arbitrary
principal sub-matrices are positive.
When −H(β′) is a P -matrix and ∇U is continuously
differentiable at β′ ∈ K, we say that β′ is a P -critical
point. The critical point is not necessarily complementary, if
the P -matrix property holds. Every P -critical point is non-
degenerate. This fact allows accounting critical points on the
boundary for their contribution to the index sum.
Lemma 2. A NE, β′ ∈ K, has a positive one index, if −H(β′)
is diagonally dominant with positive diagonal elements.
Proof. The proof is in Appendix C.
Remark 1. The NE is unique if and only if every NE, β′ ∈ K
has a positive one index.
Proof. If multiple NEs, each of which fulfilling Lemma 2,
exist, the sum of the indices is equal to the number of the NEs,∑
β′∈KInd(β
′)=|K|. This contradicts ∑β′∈KInd(β′)=1.
D. Connection between Uniqueness and Local stability of NE
The following proposition shows that the Hessian matrix
can be expressed in terms of the jacobian matrix, T from
the implicit function theorem [36]. This would allow us to
verify the condition for the row diagonal dominant matrix
property (Lemma 2) with the sufficient condition for the local
contraction (Lemma 1).
Proposition 4. Hessian matrix, H(β′) can be expressed in
terms of the jacobian matrix, T , as H(β′) = D(I−T ) where
D is a N × N diagonal matrix with [∂2Ui
∂βi2
]i, I is a N × N
identity matrix and T is a N ×N matrix [∂Mi/∂βj ]i,j .
Proof. The proof is in Appendix D.
The following lemma shows that the row diagonally dom-
inant property of the matrix −H(β′) is equivalent to the
condition that the matrix norm induced by the infinity norm
is less than one at the NE point β′, ‖T‖∞ < 1.
Lemma 3. A NE, β′, has a positive one index, Ind(β′) = 1,
if Ui is concave in βi and ‖T‖∞ < 1.
Proof. The proof is in Appendix E.
Remark 2. If every NE is locally stable (Lemma 3), K has
an exact point, its uniqueness (Remark 1).
Remark 3. Local stability of NE is equivalent to its unique-
ness (Remark 2), but the opposite is not necessarily true.
Recall that to prove that the sub-matrix −H(β′) is
a P -matrix, the determinants of arbitrary principal sub-
matrices −H(β′)|N¯ for any N¯ ⊆ N should be positive,
det(−H(β′)|N¯ ) > 0. The determinant of a sub-matrix
−H(β′)|N¯ can be expressed as, according to Prop. 4,
det(−H(β′)|N¯ ) = det(−D¯(I¯ − T¯ )) = det(−D¯)det(I¯ − T¯ )
where a matrix A¯ denotes the principal sub-matrix of a matrix
A corresponding to the indices in N¯ . The first matrix, −D¯, is
a N¯ × N¯ diagonal matrix whose elements are positive due to
the concavity of the utility function, ∂
2Ui
∂β2i
< 0,∀i. To estimate
the determinant of the second matrix, I¯− T¯ , we first let ξ¯i,∀i
be the eigenvalues of the jacobian matrix T¯ . The eigenvalues
and the determinant of the second matrix, I¯ − T¯ , are 1 − ξ¯i
and
∏
i(1− ξ¯i),∀i ∈ N¯ . Thus, we have a positive determinant,
det(I¯ − T¯ )>0, if ξ¯i < 1,∀i ∈ N¯ .
Remark 4. Local instability of NE could occur, even though
there is a unique NE.
Proof. If the minimum and maximum eigenvalues of T¯ are
less than a negative one and a positive one, respectively,
min (ξ¯i) < −1 and max (ξ¯i) < 1, ∀i, for ∂2Ui∂βiβj < 0,∀N¯ ⊆N , then according to Remark 3, the game G has a unique NE.
However, due to a negative dominant eigenvalue less than −1,
it has ρ(T¯ ) > 1. This implies that there is a unique but unstable
NE, thus divergence of M(·).
Due to the fact that the spectral radius of a matrix is bounded
by its matrix norm and the infinity norm property, we have
ρ(T¯ )≤‖T¯‖∞≤‖T‖∞. The Remarks 3 and 4 motivate us to
identify a proper contraction mapping resulting in ‖T‖∞<1
for convergence to a unique NE.
IV. CONVERGENCE OF JACOBI-PLAY DYNAMIC
In this section, we provide necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for the convergence of JP dynamic to a unique NE,
and propose a distributed algorithm where each OP checks the
conditions independently and makes an offer about the amount
of spectrum committed to the spectrum pool. Then the offers
are exchanged and so forth till consensus is reached. While
making the offer, each OP considers only its individual reward
based on the opponents’ proposals, and does not reveal any
operator-specific information to the opponents.
A. Sufficient condition for Convergence
To analyze the convergence of the JP dynamic in (2), we
consider the jacobian matrix T (t) = J (t) of the self-mapping
function in (2) and the elements of the jacobian matrix J (t)
are J (t)ij = κ
(t)
i J
BR(t)
ij for i 6= j and J (t)ij = 1−κ(t)i for i= j.
When κ(t)i = 1,∀t, the jacobian matrix T (t) corresponds
to the BR dynamic, J (t) = JBR(t) with element JBR(t)ij
8denoting the slope of the BR of i-th OP to the strategy
profile of the j-th OP: JBR(t)ij =
∂BRi(β
(t−1)
−i )
∂βj
for i 6= j
and JBR(t)ij = 0 for i = j. When ρ(J
BR(t)) < 1, then the
BR converges to the unique NE. A sufficient condition for
the BR update function to exhibit a contraction mapping is
to show that the maximum absolute row sum matrix norms
is less than one,
∑
j 6=i |JBR(t)ij | < 1,∀i (Lemma 1). When
ρ(JBR(t)) > 1, then the BR would diverge. However, if the
maximum eigenvalue for JBR(t) is less than a positive one,
there is a unique NE as discussed after Remark 3. When
κ
(t)
i 6= 1, J (t) is different from JBR. If ρ(J (t)) < 1 for
t ≥ 0, the JP converges to the unique NE. Otherwise, it would
diverge, but the stability can be ensured by selecting a proper
κ
(t)
i ,∀i, at each t as we will show later. The presence of the
diagonal terms will make the stability conditions in general
different.
Remark 5. If the matrix JBR(t) has the dominant eigenvalue
less than −1 and the other eigenvalues less than 1, then
according to Remark 4, there is a unique but unstable NE
for the BR dynamic. The instability of the BR dynamic can be
compensated by κ(t)i < 1,∀i.
Proposition 5. When the BR dynamic converges to the unique
NE,
∑
j 6=i |JBR(t)ij | < 1,∀i, the JP also converges with 0 <
κi(t) < 2/(1 +
∑
j 6=i |JBR(t)ij |).
Proof. The proof is in Appendix F.
We have shown that the JP dynamic converges, as long as
a proper κ(t)i is selected. However, the sufficient condition for
convergence does not hold, if
∑
j 6=i |JBR(t)ij | ≥ 1. According
to [42], a necessary condition for the JP scheme to converge
is |1 − κ(t)i |< 1, equivalently, 0< κ(t)i < 2, which holds for∑
j 6=i |JBR(t)ij |< 1, but does not hold for
∑
j 6=i |JBR(t)ij | ≥ 1.
Another condition is derived for ρ(JBR(t)) > 1 in [43,
Theorem 2.2]. However, the condition is quite restrictive, since
all of the eigenvalues of the jacobian matrix J should be with
non-positive real parts and the smoothing parameters should
be identical, κ(t)i = κ
(t),∀i. For stability analysis in G, the
parameter κ(t)i is not known to other OPs and it is non-trivial
to find the exact eigenvalues of J (t).
The eigenvalues of a matrix can be estimated by using
Gerschgorin’s circle theorem [40] which provides bounds on
the eigenvalues. Every eigenvalue of the matrix J (t) lies
within the union of discs, ξ ⊆ ⋃i=1 ρi, where ξ denotes the
eigenvalues of J (t) and ρi is a Gerschgorin’s circle with center
J
(t)
ii and radius
∑
j 6=i |J (t)ij |, ρi={z :|z − J (t)ii |<
∑
j 6=i |J (t)ij |}.
If every disk is inside the unit circle, every eigenvalue lies in
the union of the disk and thus ρ(J (t))<1. Since the diagonal
element in each row of the matrix J (t) is real, the center of
each circle lies on the x-axis. The eigenvalues are bounded
such that −∑j 6=i |J (t)ij |< ξ−J (t)ii <∑j 6=i |J (t)ij |,∀i and thus
−∑j 6=i |J (t)ij | + J (t)ii < ξ < ∑j 6=i |J (t)ij | + J (t)ii ,∀i. If the
lower and upper limits of the circle region are larger than a
negative one and less than a positive one, respectively, −1 <
−κ(t)i
∑
j 6=i |JBR(t)ij | + (1 − κ(t)i ) and κ(t)i
∑
j 6=i |JBR(t)ij | +
(1 − κ(t)i ) < 1, ∀i, the modulus of every eigenvalue of the
matrix J (t) is strictly less than one.
Lemma 4. If the maximum eigenvalue of J (t) is less than one,
the small value of κ(t)i in the Jacobi update can compensate
for the instability of the BR dynamics.
Proof. The proof is in Appendix G.
B. Necessary and sufficient condition for Convergence
Next, we find the necessary and sufficient condition for
convergence to a unique NE in G. For this, we show that all
eigenvalues in absolute value are less than one. This condition
is satisfied if the dominant eigenvalue is negative, larger than
a negative one. According to [44, Theorem 2], the jacobian
matrix, J (t), has exactly one negative eigenvalue with every
other eigenvalue having no larger modulus, if all principal
minors are negative. However, finding the condition on all
negative principal minors of J (t) is also difficult in G.
This non-trivial work can be resolved by recalling that in
spectrum pooling the utility, Ui, is impacted by additive com-
binations of the spectrum fractions other OPs contribute to the
pool, β=
∑
i βi. Due to the linearity, the off-diagonal elements
at row i in the jacobian matrix, Jij , j 6= i, are identical,
equivalently the slopes of each OP’s response function with
respect to each opponent are identical.
Lemma 5. In G, let an N × N matrix J =[Jij ]i,j∈N have
Jij=Ji, ∀j 6= i, and let all Ji have the same signs. When
Ji < 0,∀i, the necessary and sufficient conditions for all
eigenvalues of J to have values less than unity in absolute
form are
∑
i
−Ji
(1+Jii−Ji) <1 and |Jii − Ji|<1.
Proof. The proof is in Appendix H.
Proposition 6. In G, there is a unique NE if −1 < JBRij < 0,
j 6= i,∀i, j.
Proof. The proof is in Appendix I.
Based on Prop. 6, every OP can inform its peers whether
−1 < Jij < 0,∀j. If all indications are positive, the OPs
identify in a distributed manner that the NE is unique.
Proposition 7. In G, BR converges to the unique NE, if
− 1N−1 < JBRij < 0 j 6= i,∀i, j.
Proof. The proof is in Appendix J.
Proposition 8. In G, JP converges to the unique NE, if
0 < κ
(t)
i < κ
(t)
i,max where κ
(t)
i,max =
2
1+(N−1)|JBRij |
and
−1 < JBRij < 0 for t ≥ 0, j 6= i.
Proof. The proof is in Appendix K.
Intuitively, the use of κ(t)i within the range (0, κ
(t)
i,max) is
helpful in enabling convergence since it prevents the overreact-
ing response to the proposals from the opponents. Fig. 2 shows
an example indicating that even if there is a unique fixed point,
the BR dynamic does not converge to the desired point, but the
JP dynamic can converge with a suitable smoothing parameter
κ
(t)
i . Since each OP behaves in a myopic manner, it would
9Fig. 2. Illustration of NE divergence of BR for N = 3. Shaded area shows
BR strategy profiles responding to opponents’ aggregate proposal: There exists
a unique NE at crossing point but the BR diverges. MNO denotes mobile
network operator.
select the maximum available parameter. Since κ(t)i should
be strictly less than κ(t)i,max (Prop. 8), selecting κ
(t)
i =κ
(t)
i,max
results in divergence of the JP dynamic. Therefore, each OP
needs to select a lower value than κ(t)i,max, κ¯
(t)
i which can be
achieved by using an upper bound on |JBRij |. From Eq. (3) and
JBR, the upper bound on |JBRij | can be obtained from an upper
bound on
∣∣∣∂2Ui(·)∂βi∂βj ∣∣∣ which depends on the utility function, Ui,
based on the aggregate spectrum fraction from the opponents,
β
(t)
−i.
Algorithm 1 Jacobi-play strategy update
1: t← 0, Initialize β(t)i ∈ Si, ∀i ∈ N
2: repeat
3: for i ∈ I do
4: β(t+1)i = BRi(β
(t)
−i; δ
max
i , q)
5: if β(t+1)i /∈ contraction region then
6: κ(t)i ← κ¯(t)i
7: else
8: κ(t)i ← 1
9: end if
10: β(t+1)i =(1−κ(t)i )β(t)i +κ(t)i β(t+1)i
11: t← t+ 1
12: end for
13: until Convergence
C. Proposed distributed algorithm
In G, neither the utility functions nor the precise outcome
levels of the utility functions of other opponents need be
known to each OP. It is only necessary that each OP knows
the behavior of the actual proposals the other OPs contribute
to the spectrum pool. Given the BR update, if the contraction
condition is satisfied3, the JP uses κ(t)i = 1, acting like the
BR update. If the condition is not satisfied, κ(t)i,max becomes
less than 1, and κ¯(t)i is chosen for κ
(t)
i
4. To sum up, we set
κ
(t)
i = 1 if
−1
N−1 < J
BR
ij < 0 (Prop. 7) and κ
(t)
i = κ¯
(t)
i if
3When
∑
j 6=i |JBRij | < 1, κ(t)i,max > 1. Thus, the consequence of the
myopic manner might result in slow convergence rate.
4Convergence speed depends on how close dominant eigenvalue is to 0
[40], i.e.,κ(t)i =1/(
∑
j 6=i|JBR(t)ij |+1), ∀i, (Lemma 4).
−1<JBRij ≤−1/(N − 1) (Prop. 8). For a possible algorithm
implementation, see Algorithm 1. Note that the JP strategy
takes place only if there is a unique NE in G. The uniqueness
of NE is ensured if every OP who has a concave utility on a
box-constrained region fulfills the sufficient condition in Prop.
6. The sufficient condition can be verified distributively among
the OPs who are willing to participate in G. An OP who does
not fulfill the sufficient condition would not participate in G,
since its participation could cause the existence of multiple
NEs which is undesirable in CoPSS. We assume that the
iteration converges much faster than any change detected in
the channel.
After the iterative distributed algorithms result in converged
NE, it is natural to assume that the agreement will break if the
utility of an OP is lower than the utility corresponding to no
spectrum sharing. In [24] and [25], distributed algorithms in
non-cooperative resource allocation games were proposed to
obtain a NE. However, the strategy update step size which sim-
ilarly acts as κ(t)i in this paper is a predetermined constant [24]
or is determined by central entity [25]. Such algorithms are
not applicable to CoPSS scenario, since they do not ensure
the stability of NE in a distributed manner.
The converged NE is a point where one is likely to end
up operating after the participating OPs compete with one
another. However, even though the NE is unique, in general,
it is not an pareto-optimal, or even a desirable solution from
a social point of view. Thus, it is worth evaluating the
efficiency of the converged NE, enabled by a comparison
with the solution yielding a social welfare maximization, i.e.,
β∗ = arg maxβ∈S
∑
i∈N Ui. Denote ψ =
∑
i∈N Ui(β
′)∑
i∈N Ui(β
∗) by the
ratio of the sum of the utilities at the converged NE, β′ to the
one at the pareto-optimal point, β∗. The value of ψ indicates
how the efficiency of the NE solution degrades due to the
selfish behavior of OPs in G, i.e., ψ closer to 1 is socially
better. In this paper, the socially optimal solution is obtained
for the sake of comparison and study of NE efficiency.
OPs may disagree to operate at the social optimal solution,
if each utility at β∗ is lower than the one at β′, i.e., they want
to cooperate but nevertheless act with self-interest. In this case,
a cooperative solution based on the Nash product [45] can be
computed, i.e., arg maxβ∈S
∏
i∈N (Ui − Ui,d) where Ui,d is
the disagreement. The converged NE can play a treat point in
such a cooperative game, since it represents the outcome in
the event the OPs would realize their threat not to cooperate.
With this disagreement, we may restrict the search space for
cooperative solutions to the sub-region consisting of all points
of S, making the search space smaller than the case when
Ui,d=0 or Ui,d=Ui,o where Ui,o is the utility without CoPSS,
i.e., OPs who do not meet the sufficient condition in Prop.6
may agree to operate cooperatively with Ui,d=0 or Ui,d=Ui,o.
V. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATION
A. Parameter settings
Each OP is assumed to have BSs with a density equal to
inter-site distance of 500 m [46] and cellular users with 5
times the BS density. The distributions of BSs and cellular
users are independent. A cellular user is associated with the
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nearest home-operator BS. The intra-D2D and inter-D2D users
are randomly distributed with densities, λdi and λ =
∑
i λi.
In the numerical illustration, we use q=δmaxi =1 and thus the
densities are assumed to be the ones after a mode selection. We
take a 3GPP propagation environment [46] into account with
a distance-based pathloss function l(r) in dB: 37.6 log10(r)+
15.3 for the cellular mode and, 40.0 log10(r)+28 for the D2D
mode, where r is the distance in meters. The D2D link distance
is fixed to d=10 m. We use fixed transmit power levels equal
to 10 dBm for the D2D mode and 23 dBm for the cellular
mode [11]. The target rates for cellular users and intra-D2D
users in D2D mode are τ ci = 0.1 and τ
d
i = 1.0,∀i. Each OP
contributes the positive spectrum fraction, βmini = 0.01.
B. Convergence
Fig. 3(a) shows the concavity of the utilities with respect
to βi, proven in Prop. 1, and the monotonic property of
the constraint set with respect to δi, proven in Prop. 2.
As the optimal intra-mode selection, we have δi → δmaxi
at each iteration, due to Prop 2. Thus, from Props. 1, 2,
every OP has a concave utility on the box-constrained region,
βmini ≤ βi ≤ βmaxi (δmaxi ). From Prop. 6, the uniqueness of
NE is guaranteed if every OP meets −1 < JBRij < 0,∀i.
Proposition 9. The uniqueness of NE is guaranteed, if every
OP has a concave utility w.r.t βi.
Proof. The proof is in Appendix L.
Proposition 10. ( [7]) The BR converges to the unique NE for
N=2, if the DSC,
∣∣∣∂2Ui∂β2i ∣∣∣>∣∣∣ ∂2Ui∂βi∂βj ∣∣∣ ,∀i, j ∈ {1, 2}, is satisfied.
Proposition 11. The JP converges to the unique NE, if κ(t)i is
set to be less than or equal to κ¯(t)i = 2/(1 + (N − 1)|J¯BRij |)
where |J¯BRij | is an upper bound to |JBRij |.
Proof. The proof is in Appendix M.
Fig. 3(b) shows an example on the convergence of JP
dynamic to a unique NE for symmetric OPs. For robust
convergence, each OP independently selects a proper relaxed
κ¯
(t)
i , compensating for the instability of the BR dynamic. At
t= 1, each OP finds the strategy profile, β(1)i = 0.24, which
is not in the contraction region. As shown in Algorithm 1,
each OP uses the bounded parameter κ¯(t)i =0.95 as κ
(t)
i , and
updates the strategy profile resulting in β(1)i = 0.22 which is
in the contraction region. Then, the strategy profiles will be
set in a similar way for the next iteration and so forth. In the
end, the JP dynamic converges to the unique NE, β′i = 0.12.
Fig. 3(c) shows a divergence of the BR for the same parameter
setting as in Fig. 3(b). The BR is not a contraction due to
J
(t)
i =J
BR(t)
ij <−0.5 for N = 3 OPs and t ≥ 0. It should be
nevertheless noted that J (t)i are between −1 and 0, ∀t ≥ 0,
ensuring that there exist a unique NE (Props. 6 and 7).
C. Performance
We evaluate the performance of the OPs for different intra-
D2D densities for OP 1, λd1, while we fix λ
d
2 and λ
d
3 to be equal
to the cellular user density. We depict the spectrum fractions
contributed by the OPs in Fig. 4(a), and assess the sum rate
gain for the OPs as compared to the case without inter-
D2D support in Fig. 4(b). The gain is computed as follows:
wci ·Qci+wdi ·Qdi+wsi ·Qsi
(wci+w
s
i )·Qci,o+wdi ·Qdi,o
where Qci,o and Q
d
i,o are the average
rates of cellular users and intra-D2D users for the case without
inter-D2D support, evaluated after setting the user fraction in
inter-D2D mode q = 0 and the D2D spectrum allocation factor
β = 0, with the D2D spectrum allocation factor βdi given
the constraints τ ci and τ
d
i . In general, asymmetric OPs would
contribute unequal amounts of spectrum. All OPs experience
performance gain. One can see that symmetric OPs achieve
around 145% gain.
For densities λd1 < 5, OP 1 who has less network load
contributes the higher fraction of spectrum to the spectrum
pool, see Fig. 4(a), since it has enough capacity to satisfy
its own constraints. Hence, the opponents enjoy more benefit
from CoPSS than OP 1 does, see Fig. 4(b). The inter-D2D
user rate is larger than intra-D2D user rate, Qsi > Q
d
i , since
the total amount of spectrum committed to the shared band is
larger than the one allocated to intra-D2D users in D2D mode,
β > βdi . However, due to the decreasing fraction of inter-D2D
users, wsi , the gain obtained by OP 1 decreases along with
the densities λd1 < 5. Meanwhile, for density around λ
d
1 = 5,
all OPs come to have same network load and thus OPs 2
and 3 who benefited by contributing less spectrum fractions
contribute more, and OP 1 contributes less spectrum. All OPs
achieve equal gains at λd1 =5. On the other hand, for densities
λd1>5, OP 1 contributes only a small fraction for the signaling
channel. Other OPs still benefit by contributing some fraction,
i.e., βi>1 =0.15 and 0.34 in overlay and underlay, respectively.
One can see that OPs using the underlay principle would
contribute more spectrum for inter-D2D communications, and
experience less performance gain, under the same constraint
target values with the intra-D2D overlay approach. While
cellular and intra-D2D users suffer from the mutual interfer-
ence and less average spectral efficiency, the underlay scheme
appears to achieve higher rates for cellular and intra-D2D users
due to wider spectrum allocation. This enables an OP to have
enough capacity satisfying its own constraints. Thus, an OP
contributes more spectrum and achieves less gain compared to
the no spectrum sharing case where a higher rate is already
obtained in underlay compared to the overlay scenario.
Fig. 4(c) shows the efficiency of the non-cooperative so-
lution, the ratio of the utility sum at the NE point obtained
by Algorithm 1 compared to the utility sum at the pareto-
optimal point, ψ. A socially optimal solution can be viewed
as one type of fair allocation. The weighted P.F utility function
allocates resource more fairly between two groups, e.g., intra-
operator users and inter-operator users. An OP with this utility,
who might be able to increase its own utility by allocating
spectrum to the intra-D2D users or to the inter-D2D users,
tends to avoid choosing an extreme value in his own strategy
space for preference maximization. Such a rational manner in
P.F utility function brings more fairness among OPs, and thus
yields a result closer to the optimal one. The obtained NE
efficiency can be used as a lower bound for a two-operator
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Fig. 3. (a) Concavity and monotonicity, (b) Convergence of JP, and (c) Divergence of BR to a unique NE, when N = 3.
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Fig. 4. (a) Spectrum fraction, βi, (b) Performance gain, and (c) NE efficiency, w.r.t λd1 , when N = 3 and λ
d
i≥2 = 5.
non-cooperative spectrum sharing game, since increasing the
number of OPs leads to the NE efficiency compromise.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We studied spectrum allocation for D2D communication
considering different mobile network OPs. We modeled the
interactions between OPs as a non-cooperative game. We
showed that the formulated game has a unique NE if every
OP has a concave utility on the box-constrained region and
all eigenvalues of derivatives of iterative response process are
less than unity. Uniqueness can be identified in a distributed
manner. The non-cooperative algorithm based on the OP’s best
response might not converge to the NE due to myopically
overreacting to the responses of the other OPs. To resolve this
instability, we proposed a JP strategy update algorithm with a
proper smoothing parameter. Using the JP update we were able
to study the system and draw useful remarks. Asymmetric OPs
contribute an unequal amount of spectrum for D2D support.
An OP may contribute a small amount of spectrum, but still the
opponents may have the incentive to contribute more due to the
D2D proximity gain. We illustrated that participating OPs may
experience significant performance gains depending on the
operator-specific network load, utility and design constraints.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
For intra-D2D overlay in the weighted sum rate utility, we
show ∂
2Ui
∂βi2
= wdiQ
d
i
′′+wsiQ
s
i
′′ = (W cβciR
c
i )
′′+(W dβdi R
d
i )
′′+
(W sβRs)′′<0 where W ci =w
d
i (1−δi)+wsi (1−q), W di =wdi δi,
and W si =w
s
i q, which narrows down to
∂2Ui
∂βi2
=(W dβdi R
d
i )
′′+
(W sβRs)′′ < 0, by using the coverage probability for the
cellular uplink, Rci , derived and verified in [28] where the
cellular system is interference-limited. The constraint in (1b)
affects the upper limit of βi for a fixed δi, proven in Prop. 2.
The maximums of the D2D user rates, Qdi and Q
s
i are along the
border of the feasibility region, i.e., βdi =1−βi−τ
c
i
Rci
>1−βi−βci .
By using the Leibniz rule [31] and νdi = ν
s = 1, both
terms are negative, (βdi R
d
i )
′′ < 0 and (βRs)′′ < 0, thus
Qdi
′′<0 and Qsi
′′<0, proven in [7]. For intra-D2D underlay
in the weighted sum rate utility, βci and β
d
i are replaced by
βcdi , yielding
∂2Ui
∂βi2
= (W dβcdi R
d
i )
′′ + (W sβRs)′′ < 0. In a
similar manner, we have (βcdi R
d
i )
′′ < 0. In the P.F rate utility,
∂2Ui
∂βi2
=
wdi {Qdi ·Qdi ′′−(Qdi ′)2}
Qdi
2 +
wsi {Qsi ·Qsi ′′−(Qsi ′)2}
Qsi
2 < 0, holds
true, due to Qdi
′′ < 0 and Qsi
′′ < 0.
B. Proof of Proposition 2
We show that hdi and h
c
i are increasing i) in β
cd
i , β
d
i
and βci , and ii) in δi. i) For a fixed δi, h
d
i is increas-
ing in βdi and in β
cd
i , respectively. We show
∂hdi
∂βdi
> 0.
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By using the Leibniz rule [31], and νdi = 1, it is suffi-
cient to show ∂hdi /∂β
d
i
(p1)
≥ ∫∞
0
δie
−γβdi /η−γδic(1− β
d
i γ
η )
1+γ dγ
(p2)
=
−δiρ
ρ+δic
+ δi(ρ+1)E1(ρ+δic)
e−ρ−δic
(p3)
> δ2i c > 0 where η =
Pdl(d)
σ2 ,
inequality (p1) holds true due to
∫∞
0
2piδiλ
d
i γl(r)r
l(d)+γ·l(r) dr < γδic
and c = 2piλdi
∫∞
0
l(r)r
l(d) dr. Equality (p2) holds true due to∫∞
0
e−(ρ+c)x(1−ρx)
(1+x) dx=
−ρ
ρ+c +
(ρ+1)E1(ρ+c)
e−ρ−c where ρ =
βdi
η ,
c = δic, and E1(x) is the exponential integral. For ρ+δic > 0,
inequality (p3) holds true due to a continued fraction form
of E1(x) larger than e
−x
1+x from [31, 5.1.22]. Thus, h
d
i is
increasing in βdi for the intra-D2D overlay, and also in β
cd
i
for the intra-D2D underlay after replacing βdi by β
cd
i . Since
hci is linearly increasing in β
c
i , β
c,min
i ,β
d,min
i , and β
cd,min
i
determine βmaxi .
ii) For a fixed βi, hdi is increasing in δi for both
intra-D2D underlay and overlay. We show ∂h
d
i
∂δi
> 0. In
a similar manner to i) above, it is sufficient to show
∂hdi
∂δi
= βdi
∫∞
0
Pdi (1−δi(C′1+C′2))
1+γ dγ
(p4)
≥ βdi
∫∞
0
Pdi (1−δiC′1)
1+γ dγ
(p5)
>
βdi (β
d
i /η) > 0 where C
′
1 =
∫∞
0
2piλdi γl(r)r
l(d)+γ·l(r)dr and C
′
2 =∫∞
0
α′i2piλ
b
iγl(r)r
l(d)Pd/Pc+γld(r)
dr for the intra-D2D underlay, and C ′2 =
0 for the intra-D2D overlay. Note that the probability a BS
is active, αi [28], decreases in δi, since less D2D users
select in cellular mode. Thus α′i is negative and C
′
2 is
non-positive. Inequality (p4) holds true due to 1 − δC ′1 −
δC ′2 ≥ 1 − δC ′1 for both intra-D2D underlay and overlay.
Inequality (p5) holds true due to C ′1 < γc1 in Pdi where
c1 =
∫∞
0
2piλdi l(r)r/l(d)dr, and due to the relation in (p2)
where ρ = δic1 and c = βdi /η. Thus, h
d
i is increasing
in δi for both intra-D2D underlay and overlay. For a fixed
βi, hci is increasing in δi for the intra-D2D overlay. We
show ∂hci/∂δi =
∫∞
0
βciPci
(
νci
′ − νci (C ′3+C ′4)
)
/(1 + γ)dγ>
0. Note that the portion of time a user in cellular mode
is active in the uplink, νci [28], increases in δi, and ν
c
i
′
is positive, since less D2D users select in cellular mode.
Thus, we show
∫∞
0
βciPci (−C ′3−C ′4)/(1 + γ)dγ > 0. We
have C ′3 =
∫∞
d
α′i2piλ
b
iγl(r)r/(l(d) + γl(r))dr < 0 due
to α′i < 0. Thus, the inequality above holds with C
′
4 =
0 for the intra-D2D overlay. However, for the intra-D2D
underlay, the inequality above does not hold yet due to
C ′4 =
∫∞
0
2piλdi γl(r)r/(l(d)Pc/Pd + γ · l(r))dr ≥ 0. Instead,
as discussed in Section II, we identify τdi yielding β
cd
i,d > β
cd
i,c.
To this, the constraint in (1b) is strictly satisfied with βcdi,d
or the constraint in (1c) is violated with βcdi,c, i.e., τ
d
i >
δiβ
d
i R
d
i |βdi =τci /Rci . To sum up, hdi is, in the intra-D2D overlay,
increasing in βdi and in δi, and also, in the intra-D2D underlay,
increasing in βcdi and in δi. h
c
i is, in the intra-D2D overlay,
is increasing in βci and in δ, and also, in the intra-D2D
underlay, increasing in βcdi . And with τ
d
i > τ
c
i R
d
i /R
c
i |βdi =0,
the constraint set has ascending property.
C. Proof of Lemma 2
We consider the row diagonally dominant matrix where the
diagonal element in each row of −H(β′) exceeds the sum
of the moduli of the off-diagonal element. Then, in each row
of −H(β′), we have |−Hii(β′)|>
∑
j 6=i,j∈N |−Hij(β′)| ≥∑
j 6=i,j∈N´ | −Hij(β′)| ≥
∑
j 6=i,j∈N¯ | −Hij(β′)|,∀i. Thus,
if −H(β′) is row diagonally dominant with positive diag-
onal elements, arbitrary principal sub-matrices, −H(β′)|N¯
for any N¯ ⊆ N´ are positive row diagonally dominant,
and have positive determinants [40]. That is, −H(β′) is P -
matrix, and β′ always has a positive one index, Ind(β′) =
sign(det(−H(β′))) = 1, no matter whether β′ is interior or
boundary NE.
D. Proof of Proposition 4
The mapping function M is typically defined implicitly
through the first-order conditions5. The first order conditions
∀i, ∂Ui(Mi,β−i)/∂βi = 0 hold for all β−i [36, p25]. For
j 6= i we differentiate the first order condition for i with
respect to βj , then ∂
2Ui
∂β2i
∂Mi
∂βj
+ ∂
2Ui
∂βi∂βj
=0, yielding
∂Mi(βj)
∂βj
=−∂2Ui(Mi(β−i),β−i)∂βi∂βj
(
∂2Ui(Mi(β−i),β−i)
∂β2i
)−1
. (3)
The Hessian matrix is defined as H(β′)=[∇u1∇u2 · · · ∇uN ]T
where ∇ui = [ ∂2Ui∂β1∂βi ∂
2Ui
∂β2∂βi
· · · ∂2Ui∂βN∂βi ] is i-th row of H(β
′)
and can also be expressed as a multiplication of two N ×N
matrics, H=HUHT . The matrix, HU=[HUij ]∀i,j has elements
with HUij =
∂2Ui
∂β2j
for i= j and HUij =0 for i 6= j. The matrix,
HT=[HTij ]∀i,j has elements with H
T
ij =1 for i=j and H
T
ij =
−∂Mi∂βj for i 6=j.
E. Proof of Lemma 3
The condition for the contraction mapping, ‖T‖∞ =
‖M ′(β′)‖∞ < 1 (Lemma 1), is equal to
∑
j |∂Mi(β
′)
∂βj
| <
1,∀i which can be expressed as, according to Eq.
(3),
∑
j |∂Mi(β
′)
∂βj
| = ∑j 6=i | − ∂2Ui(β′)∂βiβj /∂2Ui(β′)∂β2i | =∑
j 6=i
|−Hij(β′)|
|−Hii(β′)| < 1,∀i and thus satisfies a row diagonally
dominant matrix, | − Hii(β′)| >
∑
j 6=i | − Hij(β′)|,∀i. If
−H(β′) is row diagonally dominant with positive diagonal
elements ensured by the concavity of the utility, β′ has a
positive one index (Lemma 2).
F. Proof of Proposition 5
According to Lemma 1, the condition based on the in-
finity norm is sufficiently satisfied if each absolute row
sum of the jacobian matrix based on Jacobi update is less
than one,
∑
j |J (t)ij | < 1, ∀i where
∑n
j=1 |J (t)ij | = |1 −
κ
(t)
i | + κ(t)i ·
∑
j 6=i |JBR(t)ij |. The condition
∑
j |J (t)ij | < 1
implies that κ(t)i (
∑
j 6=i |JBR(t)ij | − 1) < 0 for κ(t)i ≤ 1 and
κ
(t)
i (
∑
j 6=i |JBR(t)ij | + 1) < 2 for κ(t)i > 1. Therefore, if∑
j 6=i |JBR(t)ij |< 1,
∑
j |J (t)ij | < 1 is satisfied for 0 < κ(t)i <
2/(
∑
j 6=i |JBR(t)ij |+ 1) [41, p.537], due to 0 < κ(t)i ≤ 1 for
κ
(t)
i ≤ 1 and 1 < κ(t)i <2/(
∑
j 6=i |JBR(t)ij |+ 1) for κ(t)i > 1.
5It only tells us about the behavior of M near the point β
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G. Proof of Lemma 4
The conditions for the lower and upper limits of the Ger-
schgorin’s circle region to be in absolute value less than one
can be expressed in terms of κ(t)i as κ
(t)
i (
∑
j 6=i |JBR(t)ij | +
1) < 2 and κ(t)i (
∑
j 6=i |JBR(t)ij | − 1) < 0, respectively. We
observe that the condition for the upper limit is κ(t)i > 0 if∑
j 6=i |JBR(t)ij |< 1, while the condition for the lower limit is
κ
(t)
i <2/(
∑
j 6=i |JBR(t)ij |+ 1). Since the maximum eigenvalue
is less than one, instability of J (t) can only be caused
by the minimum eigenvalue. If the minimum eigenvalue is
less than −1, the BR is not stable according to Remark
4. Satisfying the condition for the lower limit of the circle
region, κ(t)i <2/(
∑
j 6=i|JBR(t)ij | + 1) sufficiently ensures the
convergence of the JP scheme.
H. Proof of Lemma 5
The characteristic polynomial of J can be written as G(ξ) =
det(ξI−J) = det(ξI−∆−Ω·1T ) where ∆ is N×N diagonal
matrix, diag[J11−J1, · · · , JNN−JN ], Ω is N × 1 column
vector, [J1, · · · ,JN ]T , and 1T is 1×N row vector. Using simple
algebra, G(ξ) = det(ξI − J) = det(ξI − ∆ − Ω · 1T ) =
det(ξI −∆) · det(I − (ξI −∆)−1Ω · 1T ) (p1)= det(ξI −∆) ·
(1−1T (ξI−∆)−1Ω) where (ξI−∆)−1 is a diagonal matrix
due to the fact that inverse of a diagonal matrix is diagonal.
The equality (p1) holds because for all N -element real column
vectors, x and y, we have det(I + x · yT ) = 1 + yT · x.
Therefore, we have det(I−(ξI−∆)−1Ω·1T ) = 1+g(ξ) where
g(ξ) = −1T ·(ξI−∆)−1Ω, and thus G(ξ) = (1+g(ξ))∏i(ξ−
di) = 0 where di = Jii − Ji and g(ξ) =
∑
i
−Ji
ξ−di noting that
(ξI −∆)−1Ω is a column vector. Without loss of generality,
we could let ξ1 ≤· · ·≤ ξN and d1 ≤· · ·≤ dN . If G(ξ) is a
continuous polynomial, then the eigenvalues of J , ξ1, · · · , ξN ,
are the roots of G(ξ) = 0. There exists a root ξi, if there exists
two numbers ξmini and ξ
max
i , ξ
min
i < ξi < ξ
max
i such that
G(ξ) evaluated at ξmini and ξ
max
i shows opposite signs due
to the continuous property of G(ξ). Note that g(ξ) = −1 can
be evaluated at ξ 6= di,∀i, and the roots of g(ξ) = −1 are
identical to the roots of G(ξ) = 0. g(ξ) is continuous in the
following intervals (−∞, d1), (d1, d2), · · · , (dN ,+∞), and it
has limξ→−∞ g(ξ) = limξ→+∞ g(ξ) = 0. When Ji < 0, g(ξ)
decreases due to ∂g(ξ)/∂ξ =
∑
i Ji/(ξ − di)2 < 0. And it
has limξ→d−i g(ξ) = −∞, limξ→d+i g(ξ) = +∞,∀i. g(ξN ) is
positive for dN < ξN <∞ due to the continuity property and
the limξ→+∞ g(ξ) = 0. Hence, the roots of g(ξ) = 0 are in
(−∞, d1), · · · , (dN−1, dN ), thus −∞ < ξ1 < d1 and di−1 <
ξi < di where 2 ≤ i ≤ N . For i 6= 1, |ξi| < 1 is guaranteed
if −1 < d1 and dN < 1, because ξi where 2 ≤ i ≤ N is
between d1 and dN , which can be ensured by |di| < 1. For
i = 1, |ξ1| < 1 is guaranteed if −1 < ξ1 < d1, because
ξ1 is between −∞ and d1. The condition can be ensured by
g(−1) > −1, because g(ξ) is decreasing in (−∞, d1) and
g(ξ1) = −1 since ξ1 is a root of 1 + g(ξ) = 0. Hence, the
condition for −1 < ξ1 < d1 is g(−1) =
∑
i Ji/(1 +di)>−1.
I. Proof of Proposition 6
Following the proof of Lemma 5, all of the eigenvalues in
JBR are less than one, if Ji = J
BR
ij < 0 and dN = Jii−Ji =
−JBRij < 1,∀i, implying that there is a unique NE since the
maximum eigenvalue is less than a positive one (Remark 4).
J. Proof of Proposition 7
According to Lemma 5, all of the eigenvalues in JBR
are inside the unit circle of the complex plain, if (i) Ji =
JBRij < 0, (ii) |Jii − Ji| = | − JBRij | < 1,∀i, and (iii)∑
i(−Ji)/(1 + Jii − Ji) =
∑
i(−JBRij )/(1− JBRij ) < 1
satisfied if each OP satisfies (−JBRij )/(1− JBRij ) < 1/N .
K. Proof of Proposition 8
According to Lemma 5, all of the eigenvalues in J (t) are in-
side the unit disk, if (i) Ji = κ
(t)
i J
BR
ij < 0, (ii) |Jii−Ji| = |1−
κ
(t)
i − κ(t)i JBRij | < 1,∀i, and (iii)
∑
i(−Ji)/(1 + Jii − Ji) =∑
i(−κ(t)i JBRij )/(2− κ(t)i − κ(t)i JBRij ) < 1. For (ii) above, we
have −κ(t)i (JBRij + 1) < 0 and −κ(t)i (JBRij + 1) > −2. If
JBRij < −1, then κ(t)i < 0. Thus, it should be JBRij > −1.
This results in the following range, 0 < κ(t)i < 2/(1 + J
BR
ij ).
The condition (iii) above is satisfied if each OP satisfies the
following condition −κ(t)i JBRij /(2− κ(t)i − κ(t)i JBRij ) < 1/N ,
equivalently κ(t)i < 2/(1− (N − 1)JBRij ). Due to JBRij <
0, κ(t)i < 2/(1 + (N − 1)|JBRij |). To sum up, we have
−1 < JBRij < 0, and 0 < κ(t)i < κ(t)i,max where κ(t)i,max =
2/(1 + (N − 1)|JBRij |). When −1 < JBRij ≤ −1/(N − 1),
the BR will not converge and κ(t)i,max becomes less than one.
L. Proof of Proposition 9
According to equation (3), the sufficient condition in Prop.
6 can be expressed as −1<JBRij =−∂2ijUi/∂2iiUi< 0 where
∂2xyUi = ∂
2Ui/(∂βx∂βy). Due to the utility structure subject
to the system framework in CoPSS scenario: in-band overlay
spectrum allocation, i.e., βcdi +βi = 1, and a shared spectrum
pool usage, i.e., β =
∑
i βi, we have ∂
2
ijUi = w
s
i ∂
2
ijU
s
i =
wsi ∂
2
iiU
s
i and ∂
2
iiUi = w
s
i ∂
2
iiU
s
i + (1 − wsi )∂2iiUdi , where Usi
and Udi are the performances for inter-D2D users and intra-
D2D users, i.e., Uki = Q
k
i or U
k
i = log(Q
k
i ) for k-type users,
yielding JBRij = −{wsi ∂2iiUsi }/{wsi ∂2iiUsi + (1 − wsi )∂2iiUdi }.
Thus, the sufficient condition is satisfied if i) |wsi ∂2iiUsi +
(1 − wsi )∂2iiUdi | > |wsi ∂2iiUsi | for 0 ≤ wsi < 1, and ii)
sign{wsi ∂2iiUsi + (1 − wsi )∂2iiUdi } = sign{wsi ∂2iiUsi } for 0 <
wsi ≤ 1, which are met by the concavity of Ui for 0 ≤ wsi ≤ 1
yielding sign(∂2iiUi) = sign(∂
2
iiU
s
i ) = sign(∂
2
iiU
d
i ). That is,
the sufficient condition is always met for any wsi in (0, 1), if
the utility of an OP is concave with respect to βi for any wsi
in [0, 1].
M. Proof of Proposition 11
The upper bound, |J¯BRij |, can be obtained by
|∫∞
0
Ps(βγ−2η)γ
1+γ dγ|
(p1)
< |∫∞
0
e
− γβ
η (βγ−2η)γ
1+γ dγ| where (p1)
holds if q> 0. κ¯(t)i is obtained by the RHS of (p1) for |J¯BRij |.
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